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Institutional Investments in Pure Play Stocks and Implications for Hedging Decisions 
 
 
 
We show that institutions invest in stocks within an industry that maintain exposure to their 
underlying industry risk factor.  These "pure play" stocks have greater numbers of institutional 
investors and institutions systematically overweight them in their portfolios while underweighting 
low industry-exposure stocks of firms in the same nominal industry.  Pure play stocks also have 
greater liquidity measured by stock turnover and price impact.  An implication of these results is 
that catering to these preferences could be an important variable in firms’ risk management 
decisions, potentially offsetting incentives to reduce volatility via hedging.  We further 
characterize institutions’ investments for pure play stocks across institution type, industries, and 
over time. 
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1. Introduction 
The common view in the academic literature is that firms hedge to reduce cash flow 
variability, which is costly to the firm because of capital market imperfections such as agency 
costs, financial distress, and underinvestment (e.g. Stulz, 1984, Smith and Stulz, 1985, Froot, 
Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993).  Textbook discussions of risk management similarly stress that 
hedging to reduce variability can make sense if it reduces the chance of cash shortfalls or financial 
distress (e.g. Brealey, Myers, and Allen, 2014; Berk and DeMarzo, 2014).  The most commonly 
discussed force that can offset firms’ incentives to reduce variability, especially for small firms, is 
fixed costs of running a risk management program (Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Géczy, 
Minton, and Schrand, 1997).1 
Empirical evidence, however, suggests that these explanations for corporate hedging may 
not be complete.  Observed patterns in derivatives use are consistent with some of these rationales, 
but to different degrees and in different settings.2  In addition, there is the somewhat puzzling 
evidence about the predicted positive relationship between hedging and firm value.  Commodity-
based firms that manage their price risk do not have higher valuations than unhedged firms 
(Tufano, 1996, and Jin and Jorion, 2006) and there is mixed empirical evidence on the association 
between currency hedging and firm value (Allayannis and Weston, 2001 and Guay and Kothari, 
2003). 
Motivated by these partial explanations and puzzles, we propose that a missing variable in 
the risk management theories could be a clientele effect associated with exposure to the firm’s 
underlying industry risk factor (i.e., being a “pure play” stock).  When firms hedge the variability 
                                                          
1 A recent exception is Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014) who discuss collateral constraints as a mitigating force 
in risk management activities. 
2 For FX derivatives in particular, the Géczy et al. (1997) model predicts just over 70% of hedgers accurately.   
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that can negatively impact the firm’s investing and financing choices, they also may be hedging 
away an exposure that investors want.  Our proposition that institutional preferences for pure play 
stocks could be an important variable in firms’ risk management decisions rests on two important 
assumptions.  The first is that institutions systematically invest in stocks with exposure to an 
industry risk factor, and the second is that firms value institutional ownership, either for its 
monitoring or liquidity benefits (Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007).  If the benefits that come from 
catering to these institutional investors are large enough, they could be an offsetting force that 
warrants not hedging.   
We take as given the second assumption that firms might value institutional ownership 
enough that it could be a relevant factor in their risk management decisions.  This supposition is 
based on insights from several areas of existing evidence.  Studies show an association between 
liquidity and the cost of capital (e.g., Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman, 2001; Chan, 2002; 
Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; and Wang, 2003), which provides a 
rationale for firms to value the liquidity provided from increased institutional ownership.  In 
addition, studies suggest that firms cater to institutional preferences in other real activities 
including dividend policy and exchange listing (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2004; Doidge, Karolyi 
and Stulz, 2004).3  Finally, firms engage in costly activities intended to attract institutional 
investors, such as investor conferences, suggesting that they view institutional ownership as 
valuable.   
                                                          
3 Anecdotal evidence suggests that managers consider the attractiveness of their stock to investors when making 
hedging choices.  In an interview in 2002, Robert McEwen, chief executive of Goldcorp, stated: “Being number one 
and ultimate gold stock are not the same. So what is the ultimate gold stock? Low risk; superior assets; very profitable 
business; leverage to gold; a strong board and management group; and excellent growth prospects. We are North 
American based, we have no debt, we are not hedged, a quarter billion dollars in cash at the end of the first half.”  
(emphasis added) McEwen (2002)  
 4 
 
We cannot, however, take as given the first assumption that institutions systematically 
invest in stocks with exposure to an industry risk factor.  Whether and when institutions invest in 
pure play stocks is an open empirical question.4 
Our goal is to address this question by characterizing institutions' investments in stocks 
that maintain high within-industry exposure to the underlying industry risk factor (“pure play” 
stocks) on average and across different industries, institution types, and through time.  Our 
selection of characteristics to analyze is guided by commonly observed features of the institutional 
investment process that shape institutions’ holdings decisions.  These features include contractual 
arrangements in the delegated asset management industry that regularly include industry 
performance benchmarks and concentrations of information expertise about industry sectors.  The 
idea that institutions would display preferences for exposure is generally intuitive given these 
features of the industry.5  We seek to understand the phenomenon in a more precise way.   
We analyze two measures of institutional investments in pure play stocks.  The first is the 
number of owners of a firm’s stock.  The second is the degree to which institutions tilt their 
portfolios toward (away from) high exposure (low exposure) stocks.  Our primary measure of 
within-industry exposure is derived from a two-factor market model that includes an industry-
factor, estimated annually within the Fama-French 30 industries.   
We document robust evidence that institutions systematically invest in pure play stocks.  
Pure play stocks have 35% more institutional investors, on average, than low-exposure stocks after 
controlling for other previously identified determinants of institutional ownership, and institutions 
                                                          
4 Investors’ preferences for intra-industry exposure are distinct from previously documented preferences for particular 
industries (e.g., Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 2005).  Not all “gold” stocks, for example, have the same degree of 
exposure to gold price risk due to differences in their underlying operations or hedging policies. 
5 In fact, the existence of the BUGS index (Basket of Unhedged Gold Stocks) provides anecdotal evidence that 
investors have preferences for industry exposures, at least within the gold industry.  
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tilt their portfolios toward pure play stocks, overweighting (underweighting) high-exposure (low-
exposure stocks) by 138 (142) basis points (bps) on average relative to the stock’s value-weighted 
share in the industry portfolio.  Investments in pure play stocks are strongest following periods of 
favorable industry news, with overweighting almost twice as large relative to periods following 
less favorable news.  Pure play stock investments are concentrated in industries in which industry 
returns explain a large fraction of firm-level returns relative to the market (“high homogeneity 
industries” including utilities, mining, tobacco, crude oil/natural gas, and coal).  In high 
homogeneity industries, institutions overweight high-exposure (underweight low-exposure) stocks 
by 388 (601) bps.  We find little evidence of preferences for industry exposure in low homogeneity 
industries (i.e., wholesale, services, games, fabricated products, and electrical equipment). 
While all institutions invest in pure play stocks, the strength of the association varies by 
institution type.  We categorize institutions using two classification schemes.  The first is the 
groupings specified by Thompson Financial: banks, insurance companies, investment advisors, 
and pensions/endowments.  The second is the groupings based on observed trading activity 
(Bushee, 1998): dedicated owners, quasi-indexers, and transient investors.6  Both classification 
schemes help distinguish institutions based on whether their primary role is monitoring or 
providing liquidity.  We find that institutional investments in pure play stocks are strongest for 
liquidity providers (e.g., investment advisors and transient investors) compared to institutions 
often characterized as providing monitoring, and the liquidity providers’ preferences are strongest 
in the high homogeneity industries. 
                                                          
6 We thank Brian Bushee for making the institution classification data available on his website: 
http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html Bushee (2011). 
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The salient factor in a firm’s risk management decision is not institutional ownership per 
se but the economic benefit that the institutional ownership provides.  Although the benefits of 
institutional ownership could come from increased monitoring or increased liquidity in the firm’s 
stock, we cannot measure the economic benefits of increased monitoring in a systematic fashion.  
We can, however, estimate the association between liquidity and industry exposure, which is 
useful given the previously documented finding that institutions classified as liquidity providers 
show the strongest preferences for pure play stocks.  We document that share turnover is 45% 
higher (29% lower) for pure play (low exposure) stocks than for stocks with medium levels of 
exposure, and price impact (Amihud, 2002) is 47% lower (61% higher) for pure play (low 
exposure) stocks.  These results suggest that the relation between exposure and liquidity is 
measurable and economically meaningful.   
We use a comprehensive sample and sample period.  Our sample firms include all stocks 
that are owned by at least one institution that files a 13F and that have Compustat and CRSP data 
available, thus we cover a comprehensive set of publicly-traded firms.  We conduct the analysis 
over the years 1984 – 2006, a long period that can encompass variation in stock market trends 
including periods of momentum and changes in the structure of the fund industry such as the 
introduction of ETFs.  We subject the analysis to multiple robustness tests.  The findings are robust 
to alternative measures of exposure and they are not explained by firm characteristics that are 
potentially correlated with industry exposure including idiosyncratic risk, liquidity, firm size, and 
financial reporting transparency.   
One implication of our analyses is that a risk management program intended to reduce cash 
flow variability also could hedge away industry exposure, which is desired by institutional 
investors.  We are not, however, proposing that this evidence implies that firms should hedge less, 
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or in the extreme, not hedge.  We are proposing that firms should weigh the potential benefits of 
increased institutional investment in the firm’s stock against the benefits that hedging can convey 
by reducing cash flow variability.  Our findings shed light on the industries that could see the 
greatest increase in institutional investment by being a pure play stock, as well as when the 
response could be greatest and from which types of institutions. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 discusses existing studies that connect to the 
analysis.  Section 3 describes the measurement of intra-industry exposure.  Section 4 presents the 
analysis of institutional ownership and of portfolio tilting, on average, including various robustness 
tests.  Section 5 presents evidence on the economic benefits of being a pure play stock.  Section 6 
provides cross-sectional evidence on which industries, periods of time and for which types of 
institutions the investments in pure play stocks are more pronounced.  Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Related literature 
A fairly robust finding in the literature is that institutional investors make investment 
decisions based on firm characteristics.  Commonly accepted characteristics include market 
capitalization (e.g., Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Bennett, Sias, and Starks, 2003; Blume and Keim, 
2014); “style” characteristics such as growth or value (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003); and dividend 
policy (Del Guercio, 1996).  A firm’s industry is another example.  Industry concentration is 
explained by institutions’ incentives to exploit information advantages (Kaperczyk, Sialm, and 
Zheng, 2005).  Yet, studies have not examined whether institutions make investment decisions 
among firms within an industry based on a firm's exposure to the underlying industry factor.   
One rationale for institutional investment in pure play stocks is the common practice in the 
delegated asset management industry of including industry performance benchmarks in customer 
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contracts.  In particular, for advisors of regulated assets (i.e., mutual funds), the SEC requires funds 
to report performance relative to a broad-based benchmark, such as the S&P500, in the registration 
statement (Form N1-A), and funds may report their performance relative to one or more other 
indexes, such as an industry index.  Performance benchmarking is voluntary outside regulated 
funds, but moral hazard and adverse selection models predict benchmarking as an optimal choice 
(e.g., Maug and Naik, 1996).  Whether regulated or self-imposed, benchmarks could affect the 
fund manager’s investment allocation decisions either directly though relative performance in 
compensation contracts or indirectly because compensation is based on assets under management 
and performance relative to a benchmark affects fund flows (e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Sensoy, 
2009).   
At the same time, asset managers can have limits on the scale and scope of their 
investments, including prohibitions against holding assets or trading financial instruments such as 
derivatives.  Given these trading constraints, which again can be regulated or self-imposed,7 a cost 
effective way for institutions to meet their stated performance objectives is to invest in stocks that 
are exposed to the relevant industry factors.   
Our analysis also is guided by theories of endogenous information gathering.  These 
“learning” models predict that investors with greater information processing capacity (i.e., less 
constrained) will engage in specialized information acquisition about common risk factors that 
affect the payoffs to multiple risky assets (Peng and Xiong, 2006; Van Nieuwerburgh and 
Veldkamp, 2010).  Having acquired the information, the investor subsequently allocates more 
                                                          
7 Mutual funds, in particular, are required to include in the registration statement their overall investment objective 
and their strategy to achieve that objective.  Funds are not required to list specific securities in which the fund can 
invest, but they are required to report the extent to which the fund is permitted to undertake broad activities such as 
borrowing, lending, and derivatives trading.  See Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) for a discussion of 
regulation associated with investment constraints in the context of evaluating fund’s choices of investment restrictions.   
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wealth to the “learning” portfolio, trading off the benefits of more precise information about those 
stocks’ future prospects with the resulting costs of under-diversification.  
Industries are given as an example of a common factor that can convey an information 
advantage.  Firms within an industry are likely to have relatively homogeneous production and 
cost functions, which increases the returns to learning about the industry because the underlying 
industry exposure more directly maps into the firm’s stock performance (Jin and Jorion, 2006).  
Evidence that a better understanding of an industry can lead to improved estimates of payoffs for 
firms within the industry is provided by O’Brien (1990), who shows that investment analysts tend 
to specialize in one industry, and Dunn and Nathan (2005), who show that analysts that focus on 
one industry produce better forecasts than analysts focusing on multiple industries.   
These rationales for institutions’ investment decisions guide us to examine three potential 
sources of variation in institutions' investments in pure play stocks.  First, we expect variation 
across industries, with institutions investing in industries in which asset managers have customer 
contracting arrangements subject to a performance benchmark.  Sector funds and funds with 
performance benchmarks will arise endogenously in industries in which specialized learning is 
optimal.  Second, we expect variation across time.  The pressure to beat benchmarks is likely to 
be strongest in industries with positive momentum.  In addition, investors are more likely to exploit 
the information advantage gained from specialized learning following favorable information.  
Third, we expect variation across institution type.  Institutions can vary in the degree to which their 
customer contracts contain performance benchmarks.  One might expect mutual fund managers, 
particularly industry sector funds, to have the strongest benchmark-beating incentives.  However, 
if other institution types have greater information processing capacity (i.e., are less constrained), 
the learning models would predict that these institutions will engage in specialized information 
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acquisition about common risk factors and allocate more wealth to the “learning” portfolio.  
Ultimately, the association between institution type and investments in pure play stocks will 
depend on the relationship between resources allocated to learning and the use of performance 
benchmarking in contracting arrangements, and the possible correlation between the two forces.   
 
3. Measuring industry exposure 
For the various analyses in this paper, we measure the industry exposure of the stock of 
each firm i at an annual frequency.  Following Tufano (1998), we use daily returns data between 
January 1st and December 31st each year y to estimate a two factor Dimson (1979) model: 
 ti
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where rmkt denotes the daily return on the CRSP equally-weighted market index, and rind denotes 
the daily return on the appropriate equally-weighted industry portfolio.  Industry exposure for firm 
i in year y is: 
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where 21  and   are the autocorrelation coefficients of rind during the same year.  We require at 
least 60 daily return observations during year y to estimate industry exposure for a stock.  Firms 
are assigned to one of the Fama-French 30 industry categories using the definitions provided on 
Kenneth French’s website.8  We consider alternative measures of industry exposure in sensitivity 
analysis described in Section 4.3, including the use of a value-weighted index in eqn. (1).  We 
                                                          
8 The 30th industry includes firms that do not fall into industries 1 to 29; we discard the small number of firms assigned 
to the 30th industry.  We thank Kenneth French for making these data available on his website: 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). 
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present results based on using equally-weighted returns to ensure that the returns from a small 
number of large companies do not overly influence our measure of industry returns, thereby 
creating a potential mechanical association between firm size and the industry beta.9 
The estimated coefficients, 
ind
iy , provide a continuous measure of firm i’s industry 
exposure in year y.  Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for βind by industry.  The average industry 
exposure ranges from 0.52 for the Electrical Equipment industry to 0.93 for the Utilities industry 
(column 1).  Intra-industry standard deviations of βind
 
 range from 0.70 to 2.01 (column 2).  These 
patterns suggest we have sufficient intra-industry variation in industry exposure to detect investor 
preferences for pure play stocks.   
We also create two indicator variables to identify high and low exposure firms within each 
industry.  BETAHIGHiy equals one (BETALOWiy equals one) if 
ind
iy  is above (below) the 70
th (30th) 
percentile industry exposure for stock i’s industry in year y.10  The within-industry measurement 
of the variables controls for the possibility that investors are attracted to particular industries with 
high average exposures and not to within-industry exposure.  The indicator variables also allow us 
to observe non-linearities in the relation between institutional ownership and a stock’s industry 
exposure.  We identify high and low exposure firms (BETAHIGH and BETALOW) before requiring 
that the sample firms have non-missing COMPUSTAT data that are necessary in the subsequent 
analysis, thus reducing potential selection bias.  The resulting sample contains approximately 
2,600 firm-year observations in each of the 23 years from 1984 through 2006.  
                                                          
9 The correlation between firm size measured by market capitalization and industry exposure in the full panel is 10%.  
The mean log market capitalization is 5.33 for high exposure observations (upper 30%) compared to 4.75 for low 
exposure observations (bottom 30%). 
10 Henceforth, we drop the subscripts i and y from βind. 
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We provide out-of-sample evidence that βind , which is based on historical data, predicts 
future exposure, which is the variable of interest for investors making portfolio allocation 
decisions.  At the start of year y+1, we form an equally-weighted hedge portfolio for each industry 
that goes long stocks classified as high exposure as of December 31 year y (BETAHIGH = 1) and 
shorts stocks classified as low exposure (BETALOW = 1) as of December 31 year y.  The portfolios 
are rebalanced annually.  We regress the returns from the portfolio on the excess returns from the 
market portfolio and the relevant industry portfolio: 
 
      findindfmktmexplowexphigh rrrrrr  (2) 
If βind, BETAHIGH, and BETALOW capture meaningful differences in industry exposure, then we 
expect to observe 0ind  .  Table 1 column 3 shows that 0ind   for all industries other than 
Electrical equipment, Wholesale, and Books.   
 
4. Empirical analysis of institutions’ investments in pure play stocks 
We characterize investor preferences using two approaches.  In the first, the unit of 
observation is a firm-year.  We examine the relation between industry exposure and the number of 
institutions that hold a firm’s stock (“institutional ownership” tests).  In the second, the unit of 
analysis is an institution-year.  We examine the extent of portfolio tilting toward pure play stocks 
(“portfolio tilting” tests). 
 
4.1 Model specifications 
For the institutional ownership tests, we use the following model to estimate the association 
between institutional ownership and industry exposure: 
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    CONTROL     LNUMINST
k
iy,kiyk
ind
iyiy     (3) 
where LNUMINSTiy is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the number of institutions 
investing in firm i in year y.  The coefficient central to the analysis is .  A significant positive 
(negative) coefficient reflects attraction (aversion) to a stock’s industry exposure (βind).  We 
determine the count of institutions that hold a firm’s stock by aggregating data from the Thomson 
Financial 13F database at the end of December each year.  We assume that firms that are not 
included in the reported holdings of any institutions on the Thomson Financial database have zero 
institutional investors.11  We estimate eqn. (3) annually for each year between 1984 and 2006.  
Standard errors in the annual regressions are clustered by industry. 
The model includes a total of 15 control variables (CONTROL).  Appendix A provides a 
detailed description of the measurement of each and Appendix B, Table B1 provides summary 
statistics.  We include 13 firm-specific control variables found to be significant in four influential 
studies (Del Guercio, 1996; Falkenstein, 1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; and Hong and 
Kacperczyk, 2009).  These control variables include firm size, market-to-book ratio, dividend 
yield, debt-to-equity ratio, the inverse of price, share turnover, price impact as a measure of 
liquidity, stock market beta, past return volatility, past average firm return, firm age, inclusion of 
the firm in the S&P 500 index, and whether the firm is listed on Nasdaq.  The firm-specific control 
variables except firm age are measured with a one-year lag.  Firm age and the two index indicator 
variables are measured contemporaneously.  Including the control variables mitigates concerns 
that an observed association between βind and institutional ownership can be attributed to a 
                                                          
11 Institutions are required to report holdings in any equity security traded on an exchange including the Nasdaq in a 
quarterly 13F filing.  The only exceptions are that holdings under $20,000 may be excluded and that institutions that 
exercise investment discretion over less than $100 million in equity are not required to file a Form 13F.   
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correlation between industry exposure and a broad asset class, such as small or large cap, value or 
growth, on which institutions are known to base portfolio allocation decisions (Barberis and 
Shleifer, 2003). 
The model also includes two proxies for investors’ expectations about the future prospects 
of an industry.  The first proxy is annual industry returns over the 12 months prior to each year 
end (January through December) based on the well-documented phenomenon of industry 
momentum (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999).  The second proxy for investors’ expectations about 
future prospects is annual industry returns over the following calendar year, which assumes perfect 
foresight. 
For the portfolio tilting tests, we measure whether institutional investors tilt their portfolios 
toward pure play stocks by comparing the percentage of an institution’s holdings to the weight 
implied by a value-weighted investment strategy within an industry that reflects no preference for 
industry exposure (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999).  For each institution j, we compute the weight of 
its holdings in stocks of each exposure type e (i.e., high, medium or low) within each industry i 
for each year y: 
1 1
S F
e s f
ijy ijy ijy
s f
PHELD MV MV
 
 
. (4)
 
The numerator is the market value of institution j’s holdings of stocks in industry i with exposure 
level e in year y, where S is the number of stocks in industry i of type e within the institution’s 
portfolio.  The denominator is the market value of institution j’s total holdings of stocks in industry 
i in year y, where F is the number of stocks in industry i within the institution’s portfolio.  We 
compute the weight for each institution at the end of December for each year between 1984 and 
2006. 
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We compute the benchmark weight (w) for each industry i in each year y as the value-
weighted percentage of stocks classified as having high, medium, or low industry exposure (e): 
1 1
G N
e g n
iy iy iy
g n
w MV MV
 
 
 (5)
 
where G is the number of firms in industry i in year y with industry exposure level e, and N is the 
total number of firms in industry i in year y.  The excess weight in each exposure category 
(XSBETA) equals the percentage held in each exposure category minus the benchmark weight: 
.e e eijy ijy iyXSBETA PHELD w   (6)
 
XSBETA measures whether, conditional on investing in a particular industry, an institutional 
investor overweights or underweights stocks with industry exposure level e relative to a simple 
strategy of investing in a value-weighted industry index. 
The excess weights across the three industry exposure categories (i.e., high, medium, and 
low) for each institution-industry-year observation sum to zero.  We expect that institutional 
investors that show preferences for pure play stocks will overweight high exposure stocks 
(XSBETA
e
ify  > 0).  The null hypothesis that institutions do not overweight (underweight) high (low) 
exposure stocks is 0.
e
ijyXSBETA   
 
4.2 Empirical results 
Table 2 Panel A presents the institutional ownership tests.  We report the average of the 
annual coefficient estimates from eqn. (3).  Significance levels are based on a test statistic 
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computed from the annual t-statistics that considers serial correlation.12  The coefficient estimates 
for the control variables are consistent with prior research.  The number of institutional investors 
holding a stock is positively associated with firm size, the inverse of price, share turnover, stock 
market beta, past firm and industry returns, firm age, and inclusion in the S&P 500 index, and 
negatively associated with the market-to-book ratio, dividend yield, debt-to-equity ratio, price 
impact, and listing on Nasdaq. 
Our main finding is a positive and statistically significant association between industry 
exposure and the number of institutions holding a firm’s stock after controlling for other firm 
characteristics.  A stock with no industry exposure would experience 23% fewer institutional 
investors than a stock with an industry exposure of one, ceteris paribus (column 1).  Using the 
indicator variables BETAHIGH and BETALOW to measure industry exposure, the coefficient 
estimates indicate that the positive association between βind and the number of institutional 
investors comes from both investments in pure play stocks and aversions to low exposure stocks 
relative to firms with medium levels of industry exposure.  A change in a firm’s industry exposure 
from the 30th percentile (low exposure stock) to the 70th percentile (high exposure stock) is 
associated with a 35% increase in the number of institutional owners. 
Panel B presents the portfolio tilting results.  The average annual value of XS_BETAHIGH 
is 0.0138, which indicates that institutions overweight high exposure stocks by 138 bps relative to 
                                                          
12    tNtZ 1  where tj is the t-statistic for year j, N is the number of years, and t  and )(t  are the mean and 
standard deviation, respectively, of the N realizations of tj.  Z has a t distribution with N−1 degrees of freedom.  
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their weights in a value-weighted industry portfolio.  Institutions underweight low-exposure stocks 
by 142 bps.  The over and underweighting are both significantly different from zero.13 
 
4.3 Robustness tests 
 Table 3 reports sensitivity analysis of the results to several alternative measures of industry 
exposure.  For ease of comparison, column (1) repeats the results from Table 2.  Panel A reports 
results using the alternative continuous measures of industry exposure and Panel B reports results 
using their indicator variable counterparts.  All models include the control variables.  The 
estimated coefficients for the control variables are consistent with the results in Table 2 in terms 
of sign, magnitude, and significance and are not reported. 
The first alternative measure is the absolute value of industry exposure.  The coefficient 
estimate on the absolute value of βind is positive and statistically significant and the results for 
BETAHIGH and BETALOW also are robust to this alternative measure of industry exposure.14   
In columns 3 through 5 we report coefficient estimates on the exposure proxies from 
models using three alternative measures of βind, all of which are derived from estimation of 
augmented versions of eqn. (1).  The model adjustments are: a) including the Fama-French (1993) 
factors (SMB and HML); b) using value-weighted market and industry returns instead of equally-
weighted market and industry returns; and c) using monthly data over a five-year period rather 
                                                          
13 Results for the full sample in Panels A and B are not sensitive to the exclusion of stocks classified in the financial 
services industry. 
14 This finding sheds light on the rationales for preferences for pure play stocks.  Incentives to beat performance 
benchmarks suggest stronger preferences for high positive exposure stocks because many funds have constraints on 
short positions.  In contrast, learning models suggest greater preferences for either extreme positive or negative 
exposure because signal precision is increased in both cases.  The magnitude of the coefficient estimate on |βind| in 
column (2) is smaller than the coefficient on βind in column (1), consistent with contracting arrangements, in particular 
constraints on short positions, dampening preferences for negative exposure stocks.  To further explore this possibility, 
we restricted the sample to those stocks with negative industry exposures (n=577).  In this sub-sample, the association 
between LNUMINST and | βind | is negative and significant (untabulated).   
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than daily data over a one-year period.  The results using the alternative measures are qualitatively 
similar to those presented in Table 2.15   
The next set of robustness tests estimates exposure preferences within characteristic-sorted 
portfolios of firms.  The analysis is intended to address concerns about omitted correlated 
variables.  We regress institutional ownership on exposure within portfolios sorted based on 
proxies for firm-specific risk (Panel A), financial reporting transparency (Panel B), liquidity (Panel 
C), and firm size (Panel D).16  These four firm characteristics are potentially correlated with both 
industry exposure (βind) and institutional investments.  If the results hold within the portfolios of 
firms with similar levels of the characteristic, then correlations between exposure and these four 
characteristics do not fully explain our results. 
Panel A reports the coefficient estimates from the model of the number of institutions 
holding a stock [eqn. (3)] within portfolios sorted based on firm-specific risk (FIRMRISK).  We 
measure FIRMRISK as the standard deviation of the residuals from the extended market model in 
eqn. (1) that controls for both market and industry risk.  Firms in the bottom (middle two) {upper} 
quartile in year y are in the low (middle) {high} FIRMRISK portfolio.17  Coefficient estimates for 
the control variables are not tabulated.  Industry exposure (βind) remains positively associated with 
the number of institutional investors within all three FIRMRISK portfolios (column 1).  The results 
using the indicator variables BETAHIGH and BETALOW show that high industry-exposure stocks 
                                                          
15 Appendix C and Table C1 describe a set of additional alternative specifications using seven macro-economic risk 
factors. 
16 The models presented in Table 2 provide controls for the main effects of three of the four characteristics: risk as 
measured by return volatility (RETVOL), liquidity as measured by price impact (PRICEIMPACT), and firm size as 
measured by the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (LOGSIZE_MVE).  In results not reported, we also 
add the variable FIRMRISK to the models in Table 2.  The coefficient on FIRMRISK is negative and significant, but 
the coefficient on industry exposure does not change. 
17 The estimated coefficients for the control variables are consistent with the results in Table 2 in terms of sign, 
magnitude, and significance and are not reported.  
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experience more institutional investors than low industry-exposure stocks across all three 
FIRMRISK portfolios.  The association, however, is lower in magnitude and less frequently 
significant in the annual regressions for firms in the upper quartile of firm risk.  Given that 
FIRMRISK is negatively correlated with firm size, one possible explanation for the dampened 
results in the high FIRMRISK portfolio is that institutions invest in small firms because of their 
size and not their industry exposure.  Consistent with this explanation, the 16 years that are 
significant are primarily in the later part of the sample period when institutional investors shifted 
their investments toward smaller firms (Blume and Keim, 2014).18  We consider the potential 
effect of size on our inferences in Panel D, discussed below. 
Table 4 Panel B reports the coefficient estimates from eqn. (3) within portfolios sorted 
based on financial reporting transparency.  This analysis is motivated by concerns that single 
segment firms, which are more likely to have high industry exposure, also have greater financial 
reporting transparency, which investors value.19  We sort firms into quartiles based on line-of-
business diversification as a proxy for financial reporting transparency.  Line-of-business 
diversification (DIVERSIFICATION) is measured as one minus the firm’s revenue-based 
concentration ratio, as defined in Appendix A.  The minimum value of DIVERSIFICATION is zero 
for a single-segment firm, which is presumed to be the most transparent.  The value approaches 
one as diversification increases (i.e., financial reporting transparency decreases).  Firms in the 
bottom (middle two) {upper} quartile in year y are in the low (middle) {high} DIVERSIFICATION 
                                                          
18 The correlation between FIRMRISK and size is –52% in the full panel.  The highest (lowest) correlation is -65.6% 
in 1992 (-41.5% in 1999).  The 16 significant years are 1985, 1990-1992, and 1995-2006. 
19 For evidence on investor attraction to transparency in general, see for example Bartov and Bodnar (1996), Boone 
and Raman (2001), and Eleswarapu, Thompson, and Venkataraman (2004).  For evidence on attraction to transparency 
by institutional investors in particular, see Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) and Bushee and Noe (2000).  For evidence 
that firms that operate in fewer lines of business, and hence are likely to have greater industry exposure, produce 
financial statements with greater information precision (i.e., transparency) about firm value, see Baldwin (1984) and 
Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith (2004).   
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portfolio.  Across all three characteristic sorted portfolios, institutions exhibit robust clientele 
effects for pure play stocks based on both the continuous measure of exposure (βind) and the 
indicator variables BETAHIGH and BETALOW. 
Table 4 Panel C reports the coefficient estimates within portfolios sorted based on liquidity.  
We proxy for the liquidity of a firm’s stock using the Amihud (2002) price impact measure 
(PRICEIMPACT), computed as the average daily price impact of trades during each year y: 


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where ri,t denotes the returns for firm i on day t excluding dividends and Voli,t denotes the number 
of shares of firm i traded on day t.  Days on which no trades are made are excluded from the 
calculations.  The smaller the price impact, the more liquid is the stock.  Following Amihud (2002), 
we normalize the measure by dividing by the mean value of the Amihud measure across stocks in 
each year.  Some extreme values remain and we winsorize the normalized measure at the 99th 
percentile.   
Firms in the bottom (middle two) {upper} quartile of PRICEIMPACT in year y are 
classified in the high (medium) {low} liquidity portfolio.  The coefficient estimate for βind remains 
positive and statistically significant within the medium and low liquidity-sorted portfolios.  The 
magnitudes are dampened and the number of significant annual estimates is lower than for the full 
panel.  The weaker results could reflect less power because of a smaller number of observations 
or could reflect a correlation between liquidity and exposure.  While the estimates are weaker, 
industry exposure nonetheless still exhibits a statistically significant incremental impact on 
institutional ownership for low and medium liquidity stocks.  However, in the high-liquidity 
portfolio, the magnitude of the relation between exposure and institutional ownership is only 
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0.0165 (and not statistically different from zero).  The results using the indicator variables 
BETAHIGH and BETALOW also suggest that institutions' investments in pure play stocks are 
weakest in high-liquidity stocks.  The difference between the BETAHIGH and BETALOW 
coefficient estimates in the high liquidity portfolio (bottom PRICEIMPACT portfolio) is only 
0.0252, and the individual annual differences are only significant in seven of the 23 annual model 
estimations.   
The dampened results in the high-liquidity portfolio may again (as in Panel A) suggest that 
firm size is an omitted correlated variable in the analysis.  The high-liquidity stocks are large firms 
(average market cap of $7.2 billion and 39.5% of the firms are in the S&P 500), which will be part 
of most institutional stock portfolios regardless of industry exposure.  In the lowest liquidity 
quartile, firms have an average market capitalization of $75 million and less than 0.1% are in the 
S&P 500.  In the full panel, the correlation between firm size and PRICEIMPACT is -0.358 (i.e., 
higher liquidity).  Given that LIQUIDITY is positively correlated with firm size, one possible 
explanation for the dampened results in the high LIQUIDITY portfolio is that institutions invest in 
large firms because of their size and not their industry exposure.  Consistent with this explanation, 
the seven years that are significant are primarily in the earlier part of the sample period when 
institutional investors demonstrated preferences for larger firms (Blume and Keim, 2014).20 
In light of the indications of time-varying size effects in Panels A and C that could 
confound interpretation of the results, we also conduct portfolio sorts based on size even though 
the main model controls for a linear association between log size and institutional ownership.  
Table 4 Panel D reports the coefficient estimates within three size portfolios.  Firms in the bottom 
(middle two) {upper} quartile of firm size measured by market capitalization are in the small 
                                                          
20 The seven years are 1985, 1988-1989, 1991, 1993-1994, and 2003. 
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(medium) {large} firm portfolio.  Across all three firm size portfolios, institutions exhibit 
preferences for pure play stocks based on both the continuous measure of exposure (βind) and the 
indicator variables BETAHIGH and BETALOW.  Untabulated results do not show a time trend in 
the significance of the coefficient estimates across the size-sorted portfolios. 
Taken together, the results in Table 4 suggest that four plausible omitted correlated 
variables are not driving our results.  The results in Panels A, C, and D, do however suggest that 
institutions exhibit size preferences although these preferences do not fully explain our results.  To 
further alleviate concerns about firm size effects, we estimate the main model using a cubic 
specification of firm size (untabulated) based on the findings of Blume and Keim (2014).  Our 
main finding that institutions invest in pure play stocks remains.21  We also estimate our main 
regression within portfolios of small cap, mid-cap, large cap, and mega cap firms as defined in 
Blume and Keim (2014).  Our results are robust across all four size-based portfolios. 
 
5. Evidence on liquidity in pure play stocks 
As noted in the introduction, the salient factor in a firm’s risk management decision is not 
institutional ownership per se but the economic benefit that the institutional ownership provides.  
A common characterization is that institutions primarily provide either monitoring or 
trading/liquidity benefits (e.g., Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007).  In this section, we examine measures 
of liquidity to assess the potential economic magnitude of the benefits to a firm from remaining 
exposed to the underlying industry factor.  We measure liquidity associated with industry exposure 
in an OLS regression model that controls for determinants identified in prior literature.  We use 
                                                          
21 The coefficient estimate on βind, the continuous measure of exposure, in this specification is 0.23.  The difference 
between the coefficient estimates on the BETAHIGH and BETALOW binary variables is 0.35.   
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two proxies for liquidity.  Share turnover (TURNOVER) is the natural logarithm of average 
monthly turnover (volume divided by shares outstanding), computed for each firm i in each year 
y.  We also use the Amihud (2002) price impact measure (PRICEIMPACT), defined previously, 
given criticisms of turnover and spread measures of liquidity (Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka, 
2009).  The model includes all of the control variables included in eqn. (3) with the exception of 
TURNOVER and PRICEIMPACT. 
Table 5 reports the results.  Column (1) shows a strong positive association between 
industry exposure and turnover.  Ceteris paribus, turnover in firms with high industry exposure is 
45% higher than in firms with medium levels of exposure, while turnover in low exposure firms 
is 29% lower than for medium exposure firms.  These results are not changed when we measure 
industry exposure using BETAHIGH and BETALOW in column 2.22  Using the natural logarithm 
of Amihud’s measure of price impact as a proxy for liquidity produces similar results in columns 
3 and 4.  Price impact is significantly and negatively related to industry exposure.  The price impact 
for firms with high exposure is 47% lower than the price impact for firms with medium exposure, 
while the price impact for low exposure firms is 60% greater than the price impact for firms with 
medium exposure. 
 
6. Evidence on investments in pure play stocks across time, industries and institution types 
In this section, we characterize variation in institutions’ investments in pure play stocks 
across time (Section 6.1), industry (Section 6.2), and institution type (Section 6.3). 
  
  
                                                          
22 The turnover results are not sensitive to excluding Nasdaq firms. 
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6.1 Time variation 
In Table 6, we condition the preferences for industry exposure on the favorableness of 
recent industry news.  As noted in Section 2, we expect the pressure to beat a benchmark and to 
invest based on acquired information are greater when the stock has positive momentum.  In 
column (1), we augment the model of institutional ownership to include interaction terms between 
the continuous industry exposure measure (βind) and indicator variables that denote if past industry 
returns are high (HIGHPASTIND) or low (LOWPASTIND), defined as above (below) the 75th (25th) 
percentile of annual returns within the industry.  The models include all of the control variables, 
but we only tabulate the coefficient estimates for the main effect of PASTINDRET.  During periods 
with favorable news about an industry, institutions’ investments in pure play stocks are 
significantly more pronounced than those during periods with neutral news about an industry 
(annual returns in the 25th – 75th percentiles).  The reverse is true during periods of unfavorable 
news. 
In column (2) the interaction terms are the products of the indicator variables for industry 
exposure (BETAHIGH and BETALOW) and the continuous measure of past industry returns 
(PASTINDRET).  After controlling for the main effect of past industry returns, the coefficient on 
the interaction of BETALOW with past industry returns is significantly negative, while the 
coefficient on the interaction of BETAHIGH with PASTINDRET is significantly positive.  Similar 
to the inferences from column (1), investments in pure play stocks and aversion to low exposure 
stocks are amplified following favorable news.  
In Panel B, we report the results of the institution-level tests of portfolio tilting conditioning 
on past industry returns.  During years of favorable past performance, institutions overweight pure 
play stocks by 258 bps compared to 157 bps in industries with low past returns.   
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6.2 Industry variation 
We examine institutions’ investments in pure play stocks across industries characterized 
based on homogeneity.  Industry homogeneity is measured as the average annual difference 
between the adjusted R2 values of two models for each industry-year: a standard market model and 
the extended market model in eqn. (1), each estimated using panel daily return data for the firms 
in industry i during calendar year y.  The greater the average difference in adjusted R2s, the greater 
is the industry homogeneity (HOMOGENEITY).23  
Figure 1 presents box plots of the industry homogeneity metric over our sample period 
from 1984 through 2006 for each of the 30 Fama-French industries.  Five industries stand out as 
having substantially higher industry homogeneity: coal, tobacco, utilities, mining, and crude oil 
and natural gas.  We designate these five industries as high homogeneity industries.  For the high 
homogeneity industries, on average, the adjusted R2 in the extended market model is 12% higher 
in absolute terms than the adjusted R2 in the standard market model.  We designate the five 
industries with the lowest average homogeneity as low homogeneity industries: wholesale, 
services, games, fabricated products, and electrical equipment.24  The adjusted R2 for the low 
homogeneity industries increases by just 0.6% in absolute terms.  The remaining industries are 
classified as medium-homogeneity.25 
                                                          
23 We also measure industry homogeneity as the incremental power of the industry factor relative to the market factor 
(F-statistic).  The measures based on both methods are highly correlated and our results are similar with both measures. 
24 We include five industries in the low homogeneity sample to match the number of industries that stand out as high 
homogeneity industries.   
25 Our classification of industries as high, medium, or low homogeneity does not change over the sample period.  
Figure 1 illustrates variation in homogeneity during the sample period for many industries, however, much of this 
variation is due to an increasing trend in industry homogeneity from 1984 through 2006 across all industries.  The 
relative ranking of the industries remains stable throughout the sample period.  The only exception is the homogeneity 
measure for the coal industry, which has a small number of firms.  All results are robust to exclusion of the coal 
industry observations from the regressions. 
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We expect institutions' preferences to be more pronounced in more homogeneous 
industries for two reasons. First, these industries are the most common targets of sector funds,26 
and sector funds are the most likely to have an industry-based performance benchmark.  Second, 
institutions are more likely to attempt to acquire an information advantage in these industries by 
learning about the common industry risk factor because the underlying industry exposure more 
easily maps into the firm’s stock performance (Jin and Jorion, 2006).   
Table 7 presents the results conditioning on industry homogeneity.  On average, 
institutions’ investments in pure play stocks are increasing in industry homogeneity (Panel A).  
Based on estimates for our continuous measure of industry exposure, a stock with zero industry 
exposure in a high homogeneity industry will have 28% fewer institutional investors than a stock 
with industry exposure equal to one, ceteris paribus.  In contrast, the difference is only 18% for 
stocks in low homogeneity industries.  Using the indicator variables for high and low industry-
exposure we find that in high and medium-homogeneity industries, a change in a firm’s industry 
exposure from the 30th percentile to the 70th percentile is associated with a 36% increase in the 
number of institutions holding the stock, compared to just 23% in low homogeneity industries.   
The portfolio tilting tests provide even more pronounced evidence that preferences for 
exposure increase with industry homogeneity (Table 7 Panel B).  Institutions overweight pure play 
stocks in high homogeneity industries by 388 bps and underweight low-exposure stocks by 601 
bps.  In medium-homogeneity industries the overweightings (underweightings) are less 
pronounced at 139 bps (105 bps), and in low homogeneity industries, institutions do not 
significantly overweight (underweight) high- (low-) exposure stocks. 
                                                          
26 The industries that we designate as high homogeneity also are the industries in which Exchange-Traded Funds 
(ETFs) are concentrated (Lipper, 2005). 
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6.3 Institutional type variation 
We classify institutional investors in two ways.  First, we use the classification system in 
the Thomson Financial database based on 13F filings, which is used in numerous prior studies of 
institutional ownership: (1) bank trusts, (2) insurance companies, (3) investment companies, (4) 
investment advisors, and (5) other.  The “other” category includes pension and endowment funds.27  
We aggregate the investment companies and investment advisors into one institution type.28  
Second, we use the Bushee (1998) classifications of institutional investors based on observed 
trading activity.  Bushee (1998) identifies three types of institutional investors: Dedicated owners, 
quasi-indexers, and transient investors.29  Dedicated owners have large, long-term holdings, 
concentrated in a small number of firms, and are more likely to gather private information about a 
firm and directly monitor its managers.  Quasi-indexers tend not to rely heavily on private 
information and adopt a passive monitoring style.  Transient investors hold small stakes in many 
firms and trade frequently on publicly available information, but they do not generally acquire 
private information. 
Table 8 reports results for institutional groupings based on 13F filings.  All models of 
institutional ownership include the same set of control variables as in the previous analyses; results 
                                                          
27 Thomson Financial reports that there is a coding error in the 13F database.  Partway through 1998, and in subsequent 
years, many banks (Type 1) and independent investment advisors (Type 4) are misclassified as other institutions (Type 
5).  Bushee’s data at http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html provides a consistent classification of 
the institutions.  
28 We combine the investment companies and investment advisors because Thomson Financial indicates that the 
Investment Company category (Type 3) includes investment advisors for which a “significant” portion of their 
advisory services are to the mutual fund business. 
29 The Bushee (1998) annual institution classifications are based on k-means clustering of standardized factor scores, 
which are created on an institution-year basis using the weighted average of firm-specific characteristics of an 
institution’s portfolio holdings.  Approximately 4% of institution-year observations are dedicated owners, 60% are 
quasi-indexers, and 36% are transient investors.  
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for the control variables are consistent with those reported in terms of magnitude, sign and 
significance, and are not tabulated.  Panel A shows that all types of institutions display a significant 
attraction to high industry exposure stocks and a significant aversion to low exposure stocks.  The 
association between institutional ownership and pure play stocks is strongest for investment 
advisors using both the continuous exposure measure and the indicator variables (columns 3 and 
7).   
Panel B reports institutional ownership results across the high and low homogeneity 
industries.  In both groups, all institution types exhibit significant preferences for industry 
exposure, with uniformly stronger preferences for stocks in high homogeneity industries.  Panel C 
reports the portfolio tilting results.  All institutions other than banks tilt toward high exposure 
stocks and away from low exposure stocks.  As in the institutional ownership tests in Panel B, the 
preferences for industry exposure are uniformly stronger in high homogeneity industries.  Only 
investment advisors exhibit preferences for pure play stocks in low homogeneity industries.  The 
banks are an exception, possibly because of their fiduciary status under the prudent man standard 
and the prudent investor rule (Del Guercio, 1996; Hankins, Flannery, and Nimalendran, 2008).   
Table 9 reports results for institutional groupings based on observed trading activity 
(Bushee, 1998).  All three categories show a positive association between institutional investors 
and exposure, and the association is driven by both an aversion to low industry exposure stocks 
and an attraction to high exposure stocks (Panel A).  Using both the continuous measure of 
exposure (columns 1 - 3) and the indicator variables (columns 4 - 6), the investments in pure play 
stocks are strongest for transient investors followed by quasi-indexers and dedicated owners.   
The averaging of the annual coefficient estimates across the 1984 to 2006 sample period 
obscures a time trend in the significance of the BETAHIGH coefficient estimate for transient 
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investors and quasi-indexers.  The coefficients are not statistically different from zero in the 1980’s 
and early 1990’s, but they are consistently significantly positive in the last ten years of the sample 
period.  This increased investment in pure play stocks by transient investors coincides with the 
introduction and rapid growth of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs).  In 1993 the first ETF was traded 
on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX).  The number of funds grew from one in 1993 to 359 
by the end of 2006, and the assets invested in ETFs grew from approximately $1 billion to $422 
billion.30  ETFs are designed to track returns in particular sectors or markets, providing investors 
with access to sector or market exposure at a lower cost than more traditional mutual funds.  A 
cost effective way for ETFs to track returns in a particular sector, such as utilities, is to invest in 
the stocks of firms that have high industry exposure.  ETFs typically hold a large number of stocks, 
so they are likely to be classified as either transient or quasi-index investors.  The rapid growth in 
ETFs may, at least in part, explain the increased investment in pure play stocks among transient 
and quasi-index investors over the last decade. 
 Table 9 Panel B reports the results for institutional groupings across high and low 
homogeneity industries.  In high homogeneity industries, all institutions invest in pure play stocks 
and avoid low industry exposure stocks.  Similar to the patterns in investment across institutions 
observed in Panel A, preferences in the high homogeneity industries are strongest for transient 
investors followed by quasi-indexers and dedicated owners.  In low homogeneity industries, there 
is limited evidence of aversion to low exposure stocks and no evidence of preferences for high 
exposure stocks.  Portfolio titling tests in Panel C show that both dedicated owners and transient 
investors overweight (underweight) pure play (low exposure) stocks in the sample of all industries.  
The excess weightings, however, are only economically meaningful for the transient investors.  
                                                          
30 The source of the annual statistics is the Investment Company Institute (ICI) Fact Book, 2008. 
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Moreover, the transient investors’ excess weightings are strongest in the high homogeneity 
industries relative to the low homogeneity industries.  Dedicated owners overweight high exposure 
stocks, regardless of industry.  
 
7. Conclusion 
We document that institutions exhibit preferences for pure play stocks, defined as stocks 
with high exposure to the firm’s industry factor.  The number of institutional investors holding a 
firm’s stock is increasing in a firm’s level of industry exposure and institutional investors 
overweight (underweight) high (low) industry-exposure stocks in their portfolios.  Institutional 
investments in pure play stocks are more pronounced during times of favorable industry news and 
in homogeneous industries that have greater intra-industry exposure to a common factor.  
Preferences for pure play stocks are reflected in investment choices by all types of institutions, but 
they are concentrated in institutions generally considered to be liquidity providers.  Consistent 
with this concentration, we observe greater liquidity in pure play stocks as measured by share 
turnover and price impact.   
Documenting these patterns is a first step in the process of studying whether and when 
firms might adjust their risk management practices to cater to investor preferences.  Our evidence 
broadly suggests that a firm’s hedging decision should weigh the potential liquidity benefits gained 
by not hedging against the benefits of variability reduction, which conventional models attribute 
to hedging.  Our cross-sectional evidence on when and where the potential liquidty benefits are 
expected to be strongest is important to guide future work that attempts to explain firms’ risk 
management decisions. 
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Figure 1: Industry homogeneity 
To measure industry homogeneity for industry j in year y, we estimate a standard market model and an extended market model that 
includes an industry factor for each firm i within industry j.  We use daily return data over the period January to December of year y.  
The extended market model includes the appropriate equally-weighted industry returns and the equally-weighted market returns.  For 
each firm i in year y, we compute the difference between the adjusted R2 values of the two models. We use the average difference in 
adjusted R2 values within an industry as our measure of industry homogeneity.  The box plot below summarizes the industry 
homogeneity across our sample period of 1984 – 2006. 
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Table 1. Summary of industry exposure by industry 
Column (1) presents the industry mean of the firm-specific estimates of the monthly industry factor 
betas (βind) and column (2) presents the intra-industry standard deviation of βind.  In column (3), 
δind is the estimated industry factor exposure in year y+1 for a portfolio that buys high-industry-
exposure firms and shorts low-industry-exposure firms.  *** {**} [*] indicates significance at the 
0.01 {0.05} [0.10] level based on robust standard errors.  
 
 
Industry 
 
No. of firm-year 
obs. in industry 
(1) 
Industry mean of 
βind  
(2) 
Intra-industry 
std dev of βind 
(3) 
 
δind 
Electrical Equipment 1,465 0.5232 1.2628 0.3295 
Telecommunications 2,494 0.5312 1.0324 0.3510*** 
Games 2,660 0.5720 1.2353 0.5536*** 
Wholesale 4,359 0.5802 1.6622 0.1986 
Household 2,082 0.5887 1.2395 0.6009*** 
Books 1,394 0.6304 1.1722 0.1146 
Meals 1,890 0.6433 1.1710 0.2732** 
Smoke 123 0.6439 0.8429 0.2558** 
Coal 145 0.6452 0.7907 0.4228*** 
Construction 3,542 0.6501 1.3512 0.6607*** 
Transportation 2,645 0.6578 1.0351 0.7340*** 
Beer 310 0.6636 1.1015 0.7095*** 
Carry 680 0.6771 1.0209 0.4214** 
Chemicals 1,730 0.6905 1.0482 0.4060*** 
Autos 1,403 0.6913 1.0697 0.4046*** 
Food 2,242 0.7060 1.3223 0.4384*** 
Clothes 1,499 0.7097 1.3554 0.2600** 
Textiles 685 0.7160 0.9776 0.8104** 
Paper 1,990 0.7358 1.1544 0.5441*** 
Services 11,597 0.7686 2.0116 0.8482*** 
Steel 1,559 0.7696 0.8655 0.6450*** 
Fabricated Products 4,330 0.7864 1.5607 0.6008*** 
Financial 23,262 0.8395 1.5710 0.4566*** 
Health 9,739 0.8531 1.4970 0.6866*** 
Retail 5,343 0.8588 1.3229 0.4191*** 
Mines 1,569 0.8859 0.8476 0.6104*** 
Oil 4,113 0.9055 0.8754 0.5102*** 
Business Equipment 13,656 0.9301 1.8013 0.8376*** 
Utilities 3,658 0.9349 0.7023 0.7991*** 
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Table 2. Industry exposure and institutional ownership 
Panel A presents average annual coefficient estimates from a regression of institutional ownership on industry factor 
price exposure and firm, stock, and industry characteristics.  Institutional ownership is measured as the natural log of 
one plus the number of institutions that hold stock i at the end of year y (LNUMINST).  Industry exposure is measured 
using the continuous variable βind and using indicator variables that equal one if a firm’s industry factor price exposure 
is greater (less) than the 70th (30th) percentile exposure (BETAHIGH and BETALOW).  Percentiles for each industry 
are recalculated for each calendar year.  Firm-specific control variables measured at or for the year ended y-1 are the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity (LOGSIZE_MVE), the inverse price ratio (INVPRICE), the natural 
logarithm of the market-to-book ratio (LOGMB), dividend yield (DIVYLD), debt equity ratio (DERATIO), turnover 
(TURNOVER), price impact as a measure of liquidity (PRICEIMPACT), stock return volatility (RETVOL), and 
average monthly firm returns (LAGFIRMRET).  Control variables measured at or for the year ended y are stock market 
beta (MKTBETA2), firm age (FIRMAGE), and indicator variables for S&P 500 stocks (S&P500) and Nasdaq-listed 
stocks (NASDAQ).  The models include industry returns over the calendar year y-1 (PASTINDRET) and year y+1 
(FUTINDRET).  Appendix A provides variable definitions.  Models are estimated annually from 1984 through 2006.  
Panel B presents the average annual excess weight placed on high- and low-exposure stocks in institutional investor 
portfolios over the period from 1984 to 2006.  The excess weights (XS-BETAHIGH and XS-BETALOW) are calculated 
relative to the value-weighted percentage of stocks with high and low industry exposure, respectively, within each 
industry each year.  *** {**} [*] indicates significance at the 0.01 {0.05} [0.10] level, based on a test statistic 
computed from the distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation. 
 
Panel A:  Firm-level tests of the number of institutional investors  
 (1) (2) 
   
Intercept 0.8341*** 1.0601*** 
LOGSIZE_MVE 0.3824*** 0.3908*** 
INVPRICE 0.2380*** 0.2452*** 
LOGMB -0.0786*** -0.0833*** 
DIVYLD -0.7692* -0.7738** 
DERATIO -0.0117*** -0.0078*** 
TURNOVER 0.1242*** 0.1369*** 
PRICEIMPACT -0.2155*** -0.2228*** 
RETVOL -1.6380 -0.8007 
MKTBETA2 0.1652*** 0.0610*** 
LAGFIRMRET 1.1286*** 1.2270*** 
FIRMAGE 0.1936*** 0.1891*** 
S&P500 0.6122*** 0.5856*** 
NASDAQ -0.2376*** -0.2444*** 
PASTINDRET 0.1800*** 0.2016*** 
FUTINDRET -0.0384 -0.0242 
   
βind 0.2276***  
BETALOW  -0.2180*** 
BETAHIGH  0.1349*** 
Difference  0.3529 
No. of years significant:  22 /23 years 
   
Average annual number of observations 2,651 2,651 
Average annual Adjusted R2 76.07% 75.69% 
      
Panel B: Institution-level tests of excess portfolio weights 
  
XS-BETALOW -0.0142*** 
XS-BETAHIGH 0.0138*** 
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Table 3. Sensitivity of models of institutional ownership to alternative measures of industry exposure  
Average annual coefficient estimates from regressions of institutional ownership on industry factor price exposure 
and firm, stock, and industry characteristics, estimated using alternative measures of industry exposure.  Panel A (B) 
present results for the continuous (discrete) measures of industry exposure.  Institutional ownership is measured as the 
natural log of one plus the number of institutions that hold stock i at the end of year y (LNUMINST).  In column (1), 
we present the results from Table 2 using βind as the proxy for industry exposure for convenient comparison.  Column 
(2) presents results using the absolute value of βind.  In columns (3) through (5), βind is derived using an alternative 
factor price model.  The top rows of the table indicate the model specification including the weighting for the returns, 
the factors included, and the frequency of the data.  All models include control variables described in Table 2 and 
defined in Appendix A.  The coefficient estimates for the control variables are not tabulated.  Models are estimated 
annually from 1984 through 2006.  *** {**} [*] indicates significance at the 0.01 {0.05} [0.10] level, based on a test 
statistic computed from the distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation. 
 
Panel A: Firm-level tests using continuous measures of industry exposure 
 Alternative measure of industry exposure 
  
Benchmark 
model from 
Table 2  
 
Industry 
exposure =  
|βind | 
 
βind from 
market model 
that includes 
Fama-French 
factors 
 
βind from eqn 
(1) estimated 
with value-
weighted 
industry and 
market returns 
 
βind from eqn 
(1) estimated 
monthly 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
βind 0.2276***  0.1517*** 0.2848*** 0.1046*** 
|βind|  0.0674***    
      
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Avg # annual obs 2,651 2,651 2,651 2,434 2,651 
Avg ann Adj R2 76.07% 75.27% 75.61% 84.13% 75.32% 
      
Panel B: Firm-level tests using indicator variables for industry exposure  
 
BETALOW -0.2180*** -0.1040*** -0.2003*** -0.1700*** -0.1287*** 
BETAHIGH 0.1349*** 0.0548*** 0.0895*** 0.1354*** 0.0166 
Difference 0.3529 0.1588 0.2898 0.3054 0.1453 
      
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 4. Exploration of alternative explanations for institutional ownership in industry exposure 
 
Average annual coefficient estimates from regressions of institutional ownership on industry factor price exposure and 
firm, stock, and industry characteristics. The models are estimated separately within characteristic-sorted portfolios based 
on firm-specific risk (Panel A), financial reporting transparency (Panel B), liquidity (Panel C), and firm size (Panel D).  
Firm-specific risk is measured as the residual standard deviation from the extended market model in eqn (1).  Transparency 
is measured as one minus the firm’s revenue-based concentration ratio, computed following Comment and Jarrell (1995).  
Liquidity is measured as the Amihud (2002) price impact measure.  Firm size is measured as the natural log of the market 
value of equity.  For each characteristic, firms are ranked into quartiles within industry by year to determine the portfolio.  
Institutional ownership is measured as the natural log of one plus the number of institutions that hold stock i at the end of 
year y (LNUMINST).  Industry exposure is measured using indicator variables that equal one if a firm’s industry factor 
price exposure is greater (less) than the 70th (30th) percentile exposure (BETAHIGH and BETALOW).  Percentiles for each 
industry are recalculated for each calendar year.  All models include control variables described in Table 2 and defined in 
Appendix A (untabulated).  Models are estimated annually from 1984 through 2006.  *** {**} [*] indicates significance 
at the 0.01 {0.05} [0.10] level, based on a test statistic computed from the distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for 
serial correlation.  The table denotes the number of years in which the annual difference between BETAHIGH and 
BETALOW is significant at the 10% level. 
 
 Panel A: 
By quartiles of firm-specific 
risk 
Panel B: 
By quartiles of transparency 
 Bottom quartile = Lowest firm-
specific risk 
Bottom quartile = Least 
diversified = Most transparent 
Bottom 
quartile 
    
βind 0.3421***  0.2336***  
BETALOW  -0.1961***  -0.2320*** 
BETAHIGH  0.1549***  0.1195*** 
Difference  0.3510  0.3515 
No. of years  
significant : 
  
22/23 years 
  
22/23 years 
     
Middle two 
quartiles 
    
βind 0.3384***  0.1418***  
BETALOW  -0.2150***  -0.1444*** 
BETAHIGH  0.2257***  0.0624*** 
Difference  0.4407  0.2068 
No. of years 
significant: 
  
23/23 years 
  
11/23 years 
     
Upper 
quartile 
    
βind 0.1874***  0.1959***  
BETALOW  -0.1576***  -0.1642*** 
BETAHIGH  0.1641***  0.0832*** 
Difference  0.3217  0.2474 
No. of years 
significant: 
 
16/23 years 
  
16/23 years 
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 Panel C: 
By quartiles of liquidity 
Panel D: 
By quartiles of size 
 Bottom quartile = Lowest 
PRICEIMPACT = Highest 
liquidity 
 
Bottom quartile = Smallest firm 
size 
Bottom 
quartile 
    
βind 0.0165  0.1907***  
BETALOW  -0.0327***  -0.1832*** 
BETAHIGH  -0.0075  0.1250*** 
Difference  0.0252  0.3082 
No. of years  
significant : 
  
7/23 years 
  
17/23 years 
     
Middle two 
quartiles 
    
βind 0.1414***  0.1813***  
BETALOW  -0.1448***  -0.1545*** 
BETAHIGH  0.0941***  0.1192*** 
Difference  0.2389  0.2737 
No. of years 
significant: 
  
22/23 years 
  
22/23 years 
     
Upper 
quartile 
    
βind 0.1185***  0.2387***  
BETALOW  -0.1155***  -0.2116*** 
BETAHIGH  0.0892***  0.1063*** 
Difference  0.2047  0.3179 
No. of years 
significant: 
  
14/23 years 
  
18/23 years 
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Table 5. Industry exposure and stock liquidity 
Average annual coefficient estimates from models of share turnover and price impact as a function of industry exposure.  
Share turnover (TURNOVER) is the natural logarithm of average monthly turnover (volume divided by shares 
outstanding) computed for each firm i in each year y.  Price impact (PRICEIMPACT) is Amihud’s illiquidity measure 
(truncated at 99th percentile).  Industry factor price exposure is measured using the continuous variable βind and using 
indicator variables that equal one if a firm’s industry factor price exposure is greater (less) than the 70th (30th) percentile 
exposure (BETAHIGH and BETALOW).  Percentiles for each industry are recalculated for each calendar year.  The control 
variables are defined in Table 2 and Appendix A.  TURNOVER and PRICEIMPACT are excluded as control variables.  
Models are estimated annually from 1984 through 2006.  *** {**} [*] indicates significance at the 0.01 {0.05} [0.10] 
level, based on a test statistic computed from the distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation. 
 
 
 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE: 
 
TURNOVER 
 
Log(PRICEIMPACT) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Intercept -4.2454*** -3.9743*** 2.1285*** 1.6357*** 
LOGSIZE_MVE 0.1305*** 0.1590*** -0.9451*** -0.9870*** 
INVPRICE -0.1176*** -0.1097*** -0.3463*** -0.3613*** 
LOGMB 0.0393*** 0.0330*** -0.1075*** -0.0972*** 
DIVYLD -2.5073*** -2.7121*** -1.4391* -1.0937 
DERATIO -0.0203*** -0.0129*** 0.0315*** 0.0192*** 
RETVOL 8.4648*** 10.3066*** 10.4503*** 7.4498*** 
MKTBETA2 0.3809*** 0.1444*** -0.5647*** -0.2154*** 
LAGFIRMRET 2.0138*** 2.2560*** -7.6994*** -8.0858*** 
FIRMAGE -0.0714*** -0.0851*** -0.1916*** -0.1719*** 
S&P500 0.2263*** 0.1719*** -1.2425*** -1.1523*** 
NASDAQ 0.2246*** 0.2053*** 0.5545*** 0.5716*** 
PASTINDRET 0.0191 0.0474 -0.3664*** -0.4169*** 
FUTINDRET -0.1397 -0.1125 0.1451 0.0996*** 
     
βind 0.5029***  -0.7389***  
BETALOW  -0.2878***  0.6095*** 
BETAHIGH  0.4522***  -0.4734*** 
Difference  0.7400  -1.0829 
No. of years significant  23/23 years  22/23 years 
     
Average annual N 2,666 2,666 2,665 2,665 
Average annual 
Adjusted R2 32.35% 27.59% 75.24% 74.22% 
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Table 6. Industry exposure and institutional ownership conditional on past industry returns 
Panel A presents average annual coefficient estimates from a regression of institutional ownership on industry factor price 
exposure, and firm, stock and industry characteristics.  The models include past industry returns interacted with measures 
of industry exposure.  Institutional ownership is measured as the natural log of one plus the number of institutions that 
hold stock i at the end of year y (LNUMINST).  In column (1), industry exposure is measured using the continuous variable 
βind.  In column (2), industry factor price exposure is measured using indicator variables that equal one if a firm’s industry 
factor price exposure is greater (less) than the 70th (30th) percentile exposure (BETAHIGH and BETALOW).  Percentiles 
for each industry are calculated for each calendar year.  All models include control variables described in Table 2 and 
defined in Appendix A; only estimates for PASTINDRET are tabulated.  The model in column (1) includes interaction 
terms that are the products of βind and indicator variables for high (low) returns, defined as above (below) the 75th (25th) 
percentile of annual returns within the industry.  The model in column (2) includes interaction terms that are the product 
of the continuous measure of past industry returns (PASTINDRET) and the indicator variables BETAHIGH and 
BETALOW.  Models are estimated annually from 1984 through 2006.  Panel B presents the average annual excess weight 
placed on high- and low-exposure stocks in institutional investor portfolios.  The averages are measured separately over 
periods of high, medium, and low past industry returns.  The excess weights (XS-BETAHIGH and XS-BETALOW) are 
calculated relative to the value-weighted percentage of stocks with high and low industry exposure, respectively, within 
each industry each year.  *** {**} [*] indicates significance at the 0.01 {0.05} [0.10] level, based on a test statistic 
computed from the distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation.   
 
Panel A:  Firm-level tests of the number of institutional investors conditional on past industry returns 
 (1) (2) 
PASTINDRET 0.1473*** 0.1922*** 
   
βind 0.2244***  
βind x LOWPASTINDRET -0.0075  
βind x HIGHPASTINDRET 0.0254**  
   
BETALOW  -0.2258*** 
BETAHIGH  0.0919*** 
BETALOW x PASTINDRET  -0.1148* 
BETAHIGH x PASTINDRET  0.1450** 
   
Average annual number of observations 2,651 2,651 
Average annual Adjusted R2 76.16% 75.74% 
      
Panel B: Institution-level tests of excess portfolio weights conditional on past industry returns 
    
 Past industry returns 
    
 High Medium Low 
XS-BETALOW -0.0015 0.0093* 0.0010 
XS-BETAHIGH 0.0258** 0.0211*** 0.0157*** 
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Table 7. Cross-sectional variation in institutional ownership based on industry homogeneity  
Panel A presents average annual coefficient estimates from regressions of institutional ownership on industry factor price exposure, and firm, stock, and industry 
characteristics, estimated separately for three categories of stocks: High, medium, and low homogeneity.  Industry homogeneity (HOMOGENEITY) is the difference 
between the adjusted R2 values from estimation of a standard market model and an extended market model for each firm i within industry j, estimated using monthly 
return data over the period January of year y – 4 to December of year y.  The extended market model includes the appropriate equally weighted industry returns 
and the equally weighted market returns.  Institutional ownership is measured as the natural log of one plus the number of institutions that hold stock i at the end 
of year y (LNUMINST).  Industry exposure is measured using the continuous variable βind and using indicator variables that equal one if a firm’s industry factor 
price exposure is greater (less) than the 70th (30th) percentile exposure (BETAHIGH and BETALOW).  Percentiles for each industry are recalculated for each calendar 
year.  All models include control variables described in Table 2 and defined in Appendix A.  The coefficient estimates for the control variables are not tabulated.  
Models are estimated annually from 1984 through 2006.  Panel B presents the average annual excess weight placed on high- and low-exposure stocks in institutional 
investor portfolios averaged over the period from 1984 through 2006.  The excess weights (XS-BETAHIGH and XS-BETALOW) are calculated relative to the value-
weighted percentage of stocks with high and low industry exposure, respectively, within each industry each year.  *** {**} [*] indicates significance at the 0.01 
{0.05} [0.10] level, based on a test statistic computed from the distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation.   
 
   Panel A:  Firm-level tests of the number of institutional investors 
 HOMOGENEITY HOMOGENEITY 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High Medium Low High Medium Low 
       
βind  0.2794*** 0.2381*** 0.1809***    
BETALOW    -0.2495*** -0.2320*** -0.1472*** 
BETAHIGH    0.1141*** 0.1437*** 0.0857*** 
Difference    0.3636 0.3757 0.2329 
       
No. of years significant:    18/23 years 23/23 years 16/23 years 
       
Average annual N 263 1,850 538 263 1,850 538 
Average annual Adjusted R2 81.69% 76.61% 71.21% 81.60% 76.16% 70.92% 
       
  Panel B: Institution-level tests of excess portfolio weights 
       
 XS-BETALOW -0.0601** -0.0105*** 0.0050    
 XS-BETAHIGH 0.0388*** 0.0139*** -0.0042    
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Table 8. Cross-sectional variation in institutional investor preferences based on 13F designation 
Results for institutions by Thomson 13F designations: banks, insurance companies, investment advisors, and pensions/endowments.  Panel A presents average 
annual coefficient estimates from multivariate models of institutional ownership as a function of industry exposure.  Institutional ownership is measured as the 
natural log of one plus the number of institutions of a particular type that hold stock i at the end of year y (LNUMINST).  Industry exposure is measured using the 
continuous variable βind and using indicator variables that equal one if a firm’s industry factor price exposure is greater (less) than the 70th (30th) percentile exposure 
(BETAHIGH and BETALOW).  Percentiles for each industry are recalculated for each calendar year.  All models include control variables described in Table 2 and 
defined in Appendix A (untabulated).  Models are estimated annually from 1984 through 2006.  The coefficient estimates presented are the averages of the annual 
estimates.  (*){**}[***] indicate statistical significance at the (10%) {5%} [1%] level.  Significance levels are based on a Z-statistic associated with the annual t-
statistics (see Table 2).  Parenthetical amounts represent the number of annual test statistics that are significant at the 10% level in the 23 annual regressions.  Panel 
B presents the results estimated separately for high and low homogeneity industries.  Panel C presents the portfolio tilting test results.  XS-BETAHIGH and XS-
BETALOW represent the excess weight calculated relative to the value-weighted percentage of stocks with high and low industry exposure, respectively, within 
each industry each year.  We present the average annual excess weight placed on high and low exposure stocks in institutional investor portfolios over the period 
from 1984 to 2006.   
 
Panel A: Firm-level tests of the number of institutional investors by Thomson 13F designations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
Banks 
Insurance 
Companies 
Investment 
Advisors 
Pensions/ 
Endowments 
 
Banks 
Insurance 
Companies 
Investment 
Advisors 
Pensions/ 
Endowments 
ind 0.1697*** 0.1929*** 0.2133*** 0.1860***     
BETALOW     -0.1622*** -0.1754*** -0.2108*** -0.1797*** 
BETAHIGH     0.1007*** 0.1277*** 0.1292*** 0.1271*** 
     0.2629 0.3031 0.3400 0.3068 
         
No. of years significant:     22/23 years 22/23 years 23/23 years 22/23 years 
         
Average annual N 2,651 2,651 2,651 2,651 2,651 2,651 2,651 2,651 
Average annual Adjusted R2 75.32% 71.12% 73.64% 73.37% 75.03% 70.69% 73.31% 73.10% 
 
Panel B: Firm-level tests of the number of institutional investors by Thomson 13F designations and industry homogeneity 
   High homogeneity industries Low homogeneity industries  
 
 
Banks 
Insurance 
Companies 
Investment 
Advisors 
Pensions/ 
Endowments 
 
Banks 
Insurance 
Companies 
Investment 
Advisors 
Pensions/ 
Endowments 
BETALOW -0.1866*** -0.2563*** -0.2346*** -0.2475*** -0.0791*** -0.1065*** -0.1626*** -0.1038*** 
BETAHIGH 0.0977*** 0.1166*** 0.1087*** 0.1389*** 0.0465*** 0.0585*** 0.0893*** 0.0349*** 
Difference 0.2843 0.3729 0.3433 0.3864 0.1256 0.1650 0.2519 0.1387 
 # of annual sig differences (17/23) (19/23) (17/23) (17/23) (10/23) (11/23) (16/23) (12/23) 
Test vs. Banks  (6/23) (8/23) (6/23)  (5/23) (12/23) (4/23) 
Test vs. Insurance companies   (5/23) (2/23)   (6/23) (2/23) 
Test vs. Investment advisors    (6/23)    (9/23) 
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Table 8, continued 
 
Panel C: Institutional-level tests of excess portfolio weights by Thomson 13F designations 
 All industries High homogeneity industries Low homogeneity industries 
 XS-BETAHIGH XS-BETALOW XS-BETAHIGH XS-BETALOW XS-BETAHIGH XS-BETALOW 
 Banks -0.0156*** -0.0120*** 0.0051 -0.0099 -0.0509*** 0.0179 
 Insurance Companies 0.0098*** -0.0178*** 0.0234** -0.0526*** -0.0154*** 0.0089 
 Investment Advisors 0.0222*** -0.0134*** 0.0491*** -0.0721** 0.0103*** 0.0009 
 Pensions/Endowments 0.0135*** -0.0222*** 0.0487*** -0.0885*** -0.0163*** 0.0082 
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Table 9. Cross-sectional variation in institutional investor preferences based on institutional investor style 
Results for institutions classified based on the Bushee (1998) trading style classifications: Dedicated owners, quasi-indexers, and transient investors.  Panel A 
presents average annual coefficient estimates from multivariate models of institutional ownership as a function of industry exposure.  Institutional ownership is 
measured as the natural log of one plus the number of institutions of a particular type that hold stock i at the end of year y (LNUMINST).  Industry exposure is 
measured using the continuous variable βind and using indicator variables that equal one if a firm’s industry factor price exposure is greater (less) than the 70th (30th) 
percentile exposure (BETAHIGH and BETALOW).  Percentiles for each industry are recalculated for each calendar year.  All models include control variables 
described in Table 2 and defined in Appendix A (untabulated).  Models are estimated annually from 1984 through 2006.  The coefficient estimates presented are 
the averages of the annual estimates.  (*){**}[***] indicate statistical significance at the (10%) {5%} [1%] level.  Significance levels are based on a Z-statistic 
associated with the annual t-statistics (see Table 2).  Parenthetical amounts represent the number of annual test statistics that are significant at the 10% level in the 
23 annual regressions.  Panel B presents the results estimated separately for high and low homogeneity industries.  Panel C presents the portfolio tilting test results.  
XS-BETAHIGH and XS-BETALOW represent the excess weight calculated relative to the value-weighted percentage of stocks with high and low industry 
exposure, respectively, within each industry each year.  We present the average annual excess weight placed on high and low exposure stocks in institutional 
investor portfolios over the period from 1984 to 2006.   
 
Panel A: Firm-level tests of the number of institutional investors by investment style 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dedicated 
Owners 
Quasi-indexers Transient 
Investors 
Dedicated 
Owners 
Quasi-indexers Transient 
Investors 
βind 0.0747*** 0.2042*** 0.2526***    
BETALOW    -0.0895*** -0.2031*** -0.2216*** 
BETAHIGH    0.0385*** 0.1152*** 0.1752*** 
Difference    0.1280 0.3183 0.3968 
       
No. of years significant:    18/23 years 22/23 years 23/23 years 
       
Average annual N 2,651 2,651 2,651 2,651 2,651 2,651 
Average annual Adjusted R2 61.66% 75.58% 72.17% 61.58% 75.26% 71.64% 
 
 
Panel B: Firm-level tests of the number of institutional investors by investment style and industry homogeneity 
 High homogeneity industries Low homogeneity industries 
 Dedicated 
Owners Quasi-indexers 
Transient 
Investors 
Dedicated 
Owners Quasi-indexers 
Transient 
Investors 
BETALOW -0.1059*** -0.1429*** -0.2608*** -0.0099 -0.0466*** -0.0350** 
BETAHIGH 0.0511** 0.0696*** 0.1138*** -0.0361*** -0.0283 -0.0143 
Difference 0.1570 0.2125 0.3746 -0.0262 0.0183 0.0207 
 # of annual sig differences  (14/23) (17/23) (21/23) (3/23) (4/23) (4/23) 
Test vs. Dedicated Owners  (3/23) (12/23)  (2/23) (4/23) 
Test vs. Quasi-indexers   (13/23)   (4/23) 
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Table 9, continued 
 
Panel C: Institutional-level tests of excess portfolio weights by investment style 
 All industries High homogeneity industries Low homogeneity industries 
 XS-BETAHIGH XS-BETALOW XS-BETAHIGH XS-BETALOW XS-BETAHIGH XS-BETALOW 
Investment Style       
 Dedicated Owners 0.0087* 0.0076* 0.0220** -0.0002 0.0256*** -0.0011 
 Quasi-indexers -0.0013 -0.0103*** 0.0207 -0.0398 -0.0268*** -0.0143** 
 Transient Investors 0.0462*** -0.0267*** 0.0796*** -0.1138*** 0.0354*** -0.0125 
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Appendix A: Control variable definitions 
We draw the control variable constructs for the determinants of institutional ownership from four sources: Del Guercio (1996), 
Falkenstein (1996), Gompers and Metrick (2001), and Hong and Kacperczyk (2009).  We winsorize all control variables except for firm 
age and the indicator variables for inclusion in the S&P 500 index and Nasdaq stocks at the first and 99th percentiles. 
 
Construct Name Description 
Leverage DERATIO Total long-term debt (including current portion) divided by total common equity at year end. 
Diversification DIVERSIFICATION 
One minus the firm’s revenue-based concentration ratio 
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1 , computed 
following Comment and Jarrell (1995).  The minimum value of DIVERSIFICATION is zero for a 
single-segment firm. 
Dividend yield DIVYLD Annual dividend per share divided by share price. 
Firm-specific risk FIRMRISK Standard deviation of residual from the two-factor extended market model in Eq. (1). 
Firm age FIRMAGE Natural log of the number of months from the CRSP start date to year end. 
Future industry stock 
return 
FUTINDRET Annual industry stock return over the 12 months (January through December) after each year end. 
Inverse of share price INVPRICE Inverse of stock price at year end. 
Firm stock return LAGFIRMRET Average monthly return during the year. 
Market-to-book ratio LOGMB Natural log of market value of equity divided by common book equity at year end. 
Firm size LOGSIZE_MVE Natural log of the market value of equity (in $ thousands) at year end. 
Systematic risk MKTBETA2 Market beta from estimation of the two-factor extended market model in Eq. (1). 
Trades on Nasdaq 
exchange 
NASDAQ 
Indicator variable equals one if the firm is traded on the Nasdaq exchange as of year end according 
to CRSP, and zero if it is traded on the NYSE/AMEX. 
Past industry stock 
return 
PASTINDRET 
Annual industry stock return over the 12 months (January through December) prior to each year 
end. 
Amihud (2002) price 
impact 
PRICEIMPACT 
Average of the daily absolute value of returns scaled by the day’s volume during year y, normalized 
by the average PRICEIMPACT of stocks for year y.  
Return volatility RETVOL Standard deviation of daily firm returns during the year. 
Included in the S&P 
500 index 
S&P500 Indicator variable equals one if the firm is in the S&P 500 index as of year end, and zero otherwise. 
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Appendix B 
Table B1. Summary statistics for dependent and control variables 
Means and medians of the natural log of one plus the number of institutions that hold stock 
i at the end of year y (LNUMINST), and regression control variables: the natural logarithm 
of the market value of equity (LOGSIZE_MVE), the inverse price ratio (INVPRICE), the 
natural logarithm of the market-to-book ratio (LOGMB), dividend yield (DIVYLD), debt 
equity ratio (DERATIO), turnover (TURNOVER), price impact as a measure of liquidity 
(PRICEIMPACT), stock return volatility (RETVOL), average monthly firm returns 
(LAGFIRMRET), stock market beta (MKTBETA2), firm age (FIRMAGE), and indicator 
variables for S&P 500 stocks (S&P500) and Nasdaq-listed stocks (NASDAQ).  The means 
and medians are for the sample of firms used to estimate eqn. (3) in Table 2 across the 
years 1984 - 2006.  
 
  Mean Median 
Log number of institutional investors LNUMINST 3.5616 3.5835 
Firm size (Log MV of equity)  LOGSIZE_MVE 5.3740 5.2828 
Inverse of share price INVPRICE 0.1790 0.0620 
Log market-to-book ratio LOGMB 0.5218 0.4550 
Dividend yield DIVYLD 0.0164 0.0033 
Leverage (Debt/equity ratio) DERATIO 1.1946 0.6433 
Log monthly turnover TURNOVER -2.9641 -2.9235 
Amihud (2002) price impact PRICEIMPACT 0.2875 0.0130 
Daily return volatility RETVOL 0.0314 0.0259 
Systematic risk MKTBETA2 0.2368 0.1969 
Average monthly return LAGFIRMRET 0.0142 0.0125 
Log firm age in months FIRMAGE 4.9543 5.0106 
S&P 500 index inclusion dummy S&P500 0.1296 0.0000 
Nasdaq firm indicator NASDAQ 0.4848 0.0000 
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Appendix C: Sensitivity of models of institutional ownership to an alternative 
measure of industry exposure conditional on macro-economic risk factor exposure 
 
As an alternative to our primary measure of industry exposure (βind), we generate an 
exposure measure using a market model that includes macro-economic risk factors: 
 imz zm
z
iym,ind
ind
iym,mkt
mkt
iyiyim FACTORrrr   
7
1         (C1) 
 
where rmkt and rind are the monthly returns on the appropriate equally weighted market and 
industry portfolios, respectively, and FACTORz is one of seven risk factors identified in 
prior research: 
1. Interest Rates (INT): Calculated as the 3 month treasury bill rate. 
2. Default Premium (DEF): Calculated as Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond 
Yield – 10 year government bond yield. 
3. Term Premium (TERM): Calculated as the yield on 10 year constant maturity 
government bonds – the yield on one year constant maturity government bonds. 
4. Foreign Exchange Rates (FX): A weighted average of the foreign exchange value 
of the U.S. dollar against a subset of the broad index currencies that circulate 
widely outside the country of issue.   
5. Commodities (COM): We use the Producer Price Index for Commodities 
provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.   
6. Small minus Big (SMB): The Fama-French monthly benchmark factor for the 
performance of small stocks relative to big stocks. 
7. High book-to-market – low book-to-market (HML): The Fama-French monthly 
benchmark factor for the performance of value stocks relative to growth stocks 
(High Minus Low). 
 
We estimate eqn. (C1) for each firm i at the end of each year y from 1984 through 2006 
using the past 60 months of monthly return data.  
 We estimate a version of eqn. (3) – the model of institutional ownership – using 
ind
iy  as the measure of industry exposure, including all control variables with β
mkt estimated 
in eqn. (C1), and including the macro-risk parameters from eqn. C1 (the z’s).  The 
coefficients on the control variables are similar to the results reported in Table 2 in terms 
of sign, magnitude, and statistical significance and are not reported.  Table C1 shows that 
industry exposure remains a positive and significant determinant of institutional ownership 
at the 1% level in all models.   
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Table C1: Industry exposure, factor price exposure, and institutional ownership 
Average annual coefficient estimates from models of industry factor price exposure as a determinant of institutional ownership in a firm’s stock.  Institutional 
ownership is measured as the natural log of one plus the number of institutions that hold stock i at the end of year y (LNUMINST).  Industry factor price exposure 
is measured using the continuous variable 
ind  estimated in eqn. (C1). The models include the exposure coefficient estimates on seven risk factors: SMB, HML, 
INT, TERM, DEF, FX, and COM.  Firm-specific control variables measured at or for the year ended y-1 are the natural logarithm of the market value of equity 
(LOGSIZE_MVE), the inverse price ratio (INVPRICE), the natural logarithm of the market-to-book ratio (LOGMB), dividend yield (DIVYLD), debt equity ratio 
(DERATIO), turnover (TURNOVER), price impact as a measure of liquidity (PRICEIMPACT) stock return volatility (RETVOL), and average monthly firm returns 
(LAGFIRMRET).  Control variables measured at or for the year ended y are stock market beta (MKTBETA2), firm age (FIRMAGE), and indicator variables for 
S&P 500 stocks (S&P500) and Nasdaq-listed stocks (NASDAQ).  The models include industry returns over the calendar year y-1 (PASTINDRET) and year y+1 
(FUTINDRET).  Models are estimated annually from 1984 through 2006.  *** {**} [*] indicates significance at the 0.01 {0.05} [0.10] level, based on a test statistic 
computed from the distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation.   
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
         
         
Industry exposure: 
ind  0.1403*** 0.1079*** 0.1068*** 0.1040*** 0.1073*** 0.1066*** 0.1049*** 0.1331*** 
Exposure to additional factors:         
SMB 0.0009 -0.0049       
HML -0.0193*  -0.0207**      
INT -0.0011   -0.0046     
DEF -0.0009    -0.0006    
TERM -0.0117*     -0.0047**   
FX -0.0097      -0.0058  
COM -0.0025       -0.0025 
         
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Average annual # of obs 2,434 2,434 2,434 2,434 2,434 2,434 2,434 2,434 
Avg annual Adj-R2 84.47% 83.64% 83.74% 83.73% 83.68% 83.70% 83.63% 83.61% 
 
 
 
